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Abstract: In this article, we present a distinction (within the category of ‘deceptive lies’) between 
two kinds of lies: doxogenic and falsifying lies, defined in terms of different conditions they need 
to satisfy; and we argue for the analytic significance of this distinction, overlooked in the literature 
on lying. In addition, we contend that the existence of these two kinds of lies pose a challenge to 
the viability of a unified definition of deceptive lies – and not even a disjunctive definition would 
prevent us from thinking that we are dealing with different phenomena. 
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Resumen: En este artículo presentamos una distinción (dentro de la categoría de ‘mentiras 
engañadoras’) entre dos tipos de mentiras: doxogénicas y falsificadoras, definidas en términos de 
las distintas condiciones que deben satisfacer; y defendemos la significación analítica de esta 
distinción, que ha sido ignorada en la bibliografía sobre la mentira. Además, sostenemos que la 
existencia de estos dos tipos de mentiras plantea un reto a la viabilidad de una definición unificada 
de las mentiras engañadoras, y ni siquiera una definición disyuntiva impediría que pensásemos 
que estamos ante fenómenos distintos.  
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Mendacity is not a minor part of human life. And having a better understanding of how it 
works may be very helpful in understanding the human. Indeed, the philosophical study 
of lying has a long tradition and very wise accounts of it have been given. In particular, 
there are some conditions for what counts as lying that most authors have traditionally 
endorsed: that the speaker makes a statement, believing that what is stated is false, with 
intention to deceive the hearer… But recently, some of these traditionally broadly 
accepted features of lying have been disputed or redefined. Specifically, some authors 
have offered counterexamples to the idea that lying necessarily involves the intention to 
deceive. According to them, there would be cases in which the speaker lies by stating 
something false, knowing or believing that what she states is false, but without the 
intention to deceive or to be believed – like when a witness gives false testimony in court 
under a death threat with no hope of being believed. 
In this paper we aim to show two things of a similar significance to what the 
defence of those non-deceptive lies has meant for the traditional definition of lying. On 
the one hand, we will propose a novel distinction between two kinds of lies, within the 
category of ‘deceptive lies’ – those to which the traditional definition of lying would still 
apply – and, on the other hand, will argue that this traditional definition cannot account 
for ‘deceptive lies’ as a whole either. The existence of these two kinds of lies, we will 
contend, challenges the viability of a unified (and non-disjunctive) definition of lying 
valid for all ‘deceptive lies’. 
We begin by commenting on the most accepted definitions and conditions of lying 
(§1), consider ‘bald-faced lies’ and the distinction between them and ‘deceptive lies’ (§2), 
and then present the two kinds of ‘deceptive lies’ that we want to tell apart: doxogenic 
and falsifying lies (§3 and §4 respectively). Subsequently, we argue for the need to rethink 
and revise the most accepted accounts (§5) and come to some concluding remarks (§6). 
 
1. Defining lying 
Let us consider, to begin with, two cases of lying: 
 
The Cake. After getting back home, Mary asks her husband John for a piece of cake that 
was in the fridge which was supposed to be reserved for their twelve-year-old son Pete. 
John seems to remember, and believes, that it was him who ate the last piece of the cake, 
but he wants to avoid being blamed by Mary and tells her that he did not. 
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Comrades. Pablo Ibbieta is a republican soldier in the Spanish Civil war who has been 
captured by Franco’s army and is about to be executed. His captors are looking for his 
comrade Ramon Gris and ask Ibietta for his whereabouts. Ibbieta knows that if the fascists 
catch Gris, they will torture and likely execute him. Therefore, as he is convinced that 
Gris is hidden in his cousins’ house, he tells them that Gris is hidden in the cemetery.1 
 
 Both cases appear to satisfy the conditions suggested by most commonly accepted 
definitions of lying. Particularly, both cases allegedly satisfy the conditions of the 
following quite canonical definition of lying due to Bernard Williams: 
 
I take a lie to be an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, 
which is made with intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content. 
(Williams 2002, 96) 
 
In our two examples, the speaker makes an assertion – that it was not himself who ate the 
piece of cake or that Ramon Gris is hidden in the cemetery – the content of which he 
believes to be false, with the intention to deceive the hearer about that content. 
In order to properly understand this definition, we need to assume that deceiving 
the hearer, A, by asserting that p involves to make A believe that p, and this involves that 
A acquires the false believe that p. However, we can see that this definition only requires 
that the liar believes p to be false, but not that what she states is actually false. This 
contrast involves a crucial point for our purposes that we will develop later on (in §2). 
 Let us have first a quick look at the conditions traditionally proposed as necessary 
conditions for lying, which will allow us to specify (mainly in §3 and §4) some 
differences between our two cases, as well as between deceptive and non-deceptive lies 
(in §2). In the long tradition of attempting to define lying, the following conditions have 
been proposed as necessary conditions for lying:  
 
- Statement Condition (SC): that the speaker makes a statement.2 
                                                 
1 This story is narrated by Sartre 1939. See also Siegler 1966. 
2 Statement, assertion and saying will be used interchangeably here.  
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- Believe-to-be-false Condition (BFC): that the speaker believes that what she 
states is false. 
- Intention-to-deceive Condition (IDC): that the statement is made with the 
intention to deceive the addressee. 
- Falsity Condition (FC) that what is stated is false. 
 
It should be noted that William’s definition includes all these conditions but FC – 
which is just the condition traditionally more called into question. And there is good 
reason for this, since it seems prima facie plausible to think that someone can lie by saying 
something she believes to be false with the intention to deceive her hearers, even though 
it turns out that what is said is not false. In The Cake, it seems that John is lying and he 
would equally be lying if it turned out, contrary to what he believed, that he did not 
actually eat the piece of cake set aside for Pete, but a different one.  
A powerful reason for this view could be that only the intention to say something 
false is under the speaker’s control but not what actually happens. It would be unfair, the 
argument runs, to make depend the attribution of lying on a fact that is beyond the 
speaker’s power – and remember the relevance for morality of lies. Hence, lying 
attributions should just depend on the speaker’s intention. Be this the reason or not, the 
fact is that the majority of authors, from Augustine and Aquinas to most of contemporary 
philosophers, have held that what is a necessary condition for lying concerning falsity is 
only that the speaker believes what she states to be false and not that this is actually false. 
(Among contemporary philosophers, FC is rejected by Chisholm & Feeham 1977, Kupfer 
1982, Williams 2002, Mahon 2008, and Fallis 2009; Carson 2006 and 2010 endorses it 
but accepts this might well be an ‘open question’; Saul 2012 remains uncommitted.) 
Therefore, according to the most accepted view, in order to lie it is not necessary 
that what is said is false but only (satisfied SC and IDC) that it is believed to be false by 
the speaker, i.e. that BFC obtains. And this seems plausible.  
On the other hand, Williams’s definition includes a requirement that is not present 
in the aforementioned conditions. It is indeed a requirement that involves a qualification 
of IDC. For Williams, in order to lie (being SC and BFC satisfied) it is not enough that 
the statement is made simply with intention to deceive the hearer, but specifically with 
intention to deceive the hearer about the very stated content. So the Intention-to-deceive 
Condition (IDC) needs to be modified as follows: 
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- Intention-to-deceive Condition à la Williams (IDCW): that the speaker makes 
the statement with the intention to deceive the addressee about the stated content. 
 
This revision is due to the fact that it is possible to state what one believes to be 
false with the purpose of deceiving the hearer not about the stated content but about 
something else. In that case it seems that the speaker would not be lying properly – but 
misleading. We will suggest now a further case to illustrate this point. 
 
Professor. Imagine a professor who knows that one of her students has cheated in an 
exam, and tells that student “Congrats! This time you’ve done a pretty good exam with 
no need to cheat”. 
 
Obviously, the professor does not intend to deceive the student about the stated 
content, since she knows that the student will not believe that he has not cheated – the 
student is perfectly aware of having done this. The professor’s intention is not to make 
the student believe what she states, but to make him believe that she, the professor, 
believes what she has stated (that she believes that the student has not cheated). 
So, when the speaker’s intention in stating that p (believing it to be false) is not to 
make the hearer believe that p, but to make the hearer believe that the speaker believes 
that p, or anything else different from p, this will not count as lying.  
In any way, and even though this qualification sounds quite plausible, our 
argument does not hinge on this point at all. Beyond the fact that both The Cake and 
Comrades appear to satisfy the conditions of these definitions, we will try to show that 
there are some significant differences between both cases, which have been overlooked 
in the literature, that call for the distinction between two kinds of lying which raises 
serious worries about the prospects of a unitary definition of lying. But we need to 
introduce first the contemporary challenge to the very condition of intending to deceive 
as necessary for lying. 
 
2. Bald-faced lies and the intention to deceive 
In recent years, however, IDC-W (for either IDC or IDCW) has been challenged. Some 
authors (see Carson 2006, 286; Sorensen 2007; Fallis 2009, 41-43; and Saul 2012) have 
argued that there are circumstances in which one can lie without having the intention to 
deceive. That is, one can lie by making a false statement, knowing (or merely believing) 
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that what is stated is false, but without the intention to deceive in scenarios in which the 
statement is warranted. Think of a witness giving false testimony in court for fear of being 
seriously harmed or even killed by a gang of organised criminals, with no hope of being 
believed (Carson 2006, 289-90).3 These have been called ‘bald-faced’, or barefaced, lies. 
On our part, we are not completely sure that in this example the speaker is really lying 
but just committing perjury, which is a legal category, given the special context in which 
speaker and audience are, although we concede that other cases are more difficult to deal 
with. For instance, when people living in authoritarian regimes repeat, or parrot, official 
truths, everybody knows they do not believe those “truths”, yet it seems that they are 
lying (see Sorensen 2007, 251-52). Note that the point of these cases is not that the liar 
is intending to deceive or to be believed by the audience even though there is very little 
hope of fulfilling this intention, but that he does not intend it at all – since she cannot 
(consciously) intend what she believes she cannot do. 
 
 There is no doubt that if we grant that IDC-W is not a necessary condition for all 
kinds of lies, a distinction between two kinds of lies in virtue of the speaker’s intentions 
will need to be made: 
 
Bald-faces lies: lies in which the speaker’s intention is merely to say something 
(believed by her to be) false in a context of justification – i.e. lies which satisfy 
SC and BFC and are said in a context in which the obligation to truthtelling is not 
cancelled.4 
 
Deceptive lies:5 lies for which the traditional view is still in place – i.e. the speaker 
states something believed by him to be false (SC and BFC) with the intention to 
deceive the hearer (about the stated content) (IDC-W). 
 
It is worth noting that ‘deceptive lies’ are conceived here as those lies in which, 
in addition to SC and BFC, IDC-W is also satisfied. That is, it counts as a ‘deceptive lie’ 
                                                 
3 It can be imagined that, before the witness gives testimony, a recording from a traffic cam has 
been projected in the room – in the witness’s presence – on which this person could be seen 
witnessing the crime. 
4 See Carson 2006, 294. The rationale for this last clause is, no doubt, to exclude from the category 
of lies such things as fiction stories, theatre performances, jokes, metaphors and ironies. 
5 The name is due to Fallis 2009, 54-56. He argues for the need of this distinction.   
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any lie which is told with the intention to deceive the hearer (about the stated content), 
independently of whether this intention is fulfilled or not. In other words, ‘deceptive lies’ 
are not only those that actually achieve the goal of deceiving the hearer, but also those in 
which the speaker intends it but does not achieve it. Deceptive lies are then those lies 
which, in contrast to bald-faced lie, satisfy IDC-W.6 
Most authors have understood IDC-W as equivalent to the intention to make the 
hearer believe the stated content which the speaker believes to be false. In this line, for 
one case, Jennifer Saul asks how should we include in the definition of lying this intention 
to deceive about the stated content, and she reaches the conclusion that “[t]he obvious 
way to incorporate this is to require an intention that the audience believe what is said 
(which the speaker knows/believes to be false). Many theorists require precisely this.” 
(Saul 2012, 8; see also Stokke 2013, 348).  
In this line, consider the following definition of lying, which – in his entry on 
lying and deception for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – James Mahon takes 
as the currently most accepted definition in the literature: 
 
To lie=df to make a believed-false statement to another person with the intention 
that the other person believes that statement to be true. (Mahon 2016) 
 
Our two examples also seem to satisfy this definition. The speaker – John and 
Ibbieta, respectively – makes the hearer (or audience) a believed-false statement – that it 
was not himself who ate the piece of cake or that Ramon Gris is hidden in the cemetery 
– with the intention that the hearers believe that statement. 
Mahon’s definition does not require falsity but only that the liar believes the 
statement to be false. His and Williams’s definitions are quite similar if we equate to make 
someone believe something false and to deceive someone. However, it needs to be 
stressed – and this is a crucial point – that if FC is not endorsed as a condition for lying, 
as the most popular accounts do, then the speaker’s intention to make the hearer believe 
that p (believed to be false by the speaker) is not necessarily the same intention as the 
intention to deceive the hearer about p. If p is false, obviously the fulfilment of the first 
intention involves the fulfilment of the second. But, if as most authors claim one can lie 
                                                 
6 Not all non-deceptive lies need to be bald-faced lies. See Sorensen 2010 on what he calls 
‘knowledge-lies’. 
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by saying something true but believed to be false, then one can be believed in saying that 
p (that she believes to be false) without deceiving, i.e. without making the hearer believe 
something false. Augustine already said in De Mendacio (3, 3) that there are two ways in 
which the intention to deceive the hearer can fail to be accomplished: 1) that the hearer 
does not believe the one who lies, and 2) that the hearer believes what the speaker says 
but, unbeknownst to the speaker, what this says is not false. 
 The crucial point here is particularly that if what the speaker asserts is not false, 
then it is not true that in lying the intention to make the hearer believe that p and the 
intention to deceive about p are the same intention, even if the speaker believes it. Both 
intentions cannot simply be equated, as it is proved by the fact that one can be fulfilled 
while the other is not. To say it again, if we individuate the speaker’s intentions by means 
of their satisfaction conditions, then in lying the intention to be believed and the intention 
to deceive cannot be equated, since it can be the case that one is accomplished while the 
other is not. 
 However, it might be objected that this is not a big worry since what the liar 
genuinely intends is not exactly to deceive but to make the hearer believe what he says 
(and believes to be false) – as stated in Mahon’s definition. The goal of the liar will be 
accomplished if she gets this, regardless of the truth-value of what she says. That is, the 
liar states that p, believing that p is false, and wants that the hearer believes that p. She 
will achieve her goal if the hearer believes that p, despite the fact that p is not actually 
false.  
Yet, we will argue in the next sections that this worry is not as easy to solve for 
all cases. Particularly, we will try to bring to light the importance of the distinction 
between intending to deceive and intending to be believed by telling apart two kinds of 
‘deceptive lies’ – even though ordinary language does not have specific names for them. 
 
3. Doxogenic lies 
Now, let us come back to the starting cases, particularly to the first one. In The Cake John 
tells Mary, believing it to be false, that he did not eat the piece of cake (p) with the 
intention to make Mary believe it. John’s aim is to make Mary believe what he says, since 
it hinges on Mary’s acquiring this belief that he will not be blamed. If he gets Mary to 
believe that p, will he have not fully satisfied his intention – the guiding intention of his 
assertion? It is obvious that he will. If it turned out that, although he now thinks he did, 
he actually did not eat the piece of cake, would he think that his intention has not been 
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accomplished because Mary, in believing his lie, is believing something true? He will 
not. Imagine that eventually Pete approaches her mother and says it was him who ate the 
last piece of cake. It seems instead that John would be even happier, because this would 
avoid him being the target of Mary’s annoyance if he were caught and afterwards had to 
make up a story, a new lie, or to apologize. What he aims at by lying to Mary is that she 
believes that p (the asserted content) irrespective of the fact that this is false or true, 
although certainly he believes it to be false. John’s intention is that Mary acquires the 
belief that he did not eat the piece of cake set aside for their son. To deceive Mary would 
just be a consequence of the satisfaction of his intention – a consequence that John also 
thinks will occur, and even considers it necessary – but which is not in fact necessary for 
achieving all he actually aims at. It is not necessary for his intention to be fully fulfilled. 
  Therefore, The Cake rather shows that the speaker’s intention needs not be in fact 
to deceive but to make believe what he says – and believes to be false. If to deceive is to 
make the hearer believe something false, what this shows is indeed that the liar’s intention 
can be accomplished simply by making the hearer believe what has been said, regardless 
of whether the hearer is deceived.  
This suggests that we should replace IDC-W – that the speaker makes the 
statement with the intention to deceive the hearer (about the stated content) – with this 
new condition: 
 
- Intention-to-make-believe Condition (IMBC): that the speaker makes the 
statement with the intention to make the hearer believe the content of this 
statement. 
 
From the liar’s subjective perspective, the intention to be believed amounts to the 
intention to deceive – his intention to get the hearer, A, to believe that p coincides with 
his intention to deceive A about p, since he (believing that p is false) will think that if A 
believes that p, then A will have acquired a false belief, i.e. A will have been deceived. 
But, given that sometimes p may not be false, it happens that there is an objective gap 
between both intentions: to be believed (regarding what one believes to be false) without 
deceiving. And indeed definitions of lying should reflect this.  
Therefore, given that IMBC is not in all cases equivalent to IDC-W, there is at 
least one kind of lies – within the category of ‘deceptive lies’ – which are defined as the 
joint satisfaction of SC, BFC and IMBC, but not of SC, BFC and IDC-W. We propose to 
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call this lies doxogenic lies provided that their characteristic intention is satisfied only by 
producing a particular belief in the hearer – the belief corresponding to the content stated 
by the speaker (that she believes to be false).  
However, this is not all because, as we will now argue, doxogenic lies are 
significantly different from another kind of ‘deceptive lies’. 
 
4. Falsifying lies 
Now the liar not always will be satisfied with the mere fact of being believed. To see what 
we mean, compare The Cake – which we propose as prototypical of doxogenic lies – with 
Comrades. Recall it: Pablo Ibbieta, convinced that Gris is hidden in his cousins’ place, 
tells his captors that Gris is hidden in the cemetery. But regrettably he is not very lucky. 
Sartre’s end for this story is that, against what Ibbieta believed, it turns out that Gris is 
actually in the cemetery and is trapped by the facists. Ibbieta becomes emotionally 
destroyed when he knows about this.  
In this case, like in The Cake, S, the speaker, states that p, believing that p is false, 
with the intention to make A, the addressees, believe what S says – intention that is 
fulfilled. However, has S achieved his goal, what he wanted to get by telling A that p? As 
a test we can ask whether Ibbieta essentially wanted their interrogators to believe that p, 
even though that did not entail deceiving them. It seems clear that the answer is “no”. 
Ibbieta did not simply want them to believe that p. To make them believe that p was just 
his means to deceive them. If p turned out to be true (as it indeed turned out to be), it 
would be better for him that they did not acquire that belief. Again, his intention was to 
deceive his interrogators, and make them believe that p is only a means to that end – a 
means that will be valid only if p is in fact false. The speaker wants the hearers to believe 
that p only if p is false. In this case, unlike The Cake, being believed is not sufficient for 
the speaker to fulfil his intention, since his intention is actually to deceive the hearers. If 
in acquiring the belief that p, the hearers are not deceived – and acquire instead a true 
belief – the speaker would not have wanted them to believe that p, since this will not be 
a way to achieve his aim. 
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In short, Ibbieta aims at falsifying reality, i.e. it is essential to his intention that the 
belief acquired by his interrogators is false. We will consequently call lies of this second 
kind falsifying lies, and define them as the joint satisfaction of SC, BFC and IDC-W.7 
Let us now compare the liars’ distinctive intentions in The Cake and Comrades 
with the contrasting intentions that some agents, for instance a couple of mountain 
climbers, may have.8 
 
The Climbers. A and B are two mountain climbers who plan to ascend to Mount X’s peak. 
Climber A just wants to ascend to Mount X’s peak, whereas Climber B wants to ascend 
to Mount X’s peak because he wants to climb the highest mountain in the area.  
 
It seems obvious that if A reaches the peak, A will have fulfilled her intention and 
achieved her aim. Whereas in the case of B it is not sure that B achieves her aim only by 
reaching the peak. If B reaches the peak but in spite of what B thought initially the highest 
mountain in the area is not Mount X, but Mount Y, then B will not have achieved her real 
aim. To ascend to Mount X was for B only a means to satisfy her real purpose, which was 
to surmount the highest mountain in the area. Instead, A will only fail in what she intends 
if she cannot reach the peak. For B, however, there are two ways to fail in her intending: 
either not reaching Mount X’s peak or Mount X not being the highest mountain in the 
area – and the latter does not depend on whether she does or does not reach the peak. If 
B knew that Mount X is not the highest mountain in the area, she would not have been 
interested in ascending to its peak. And B’s intention is not the addition of climbing 
Mount X and ascending to the highest peak in the area – B’s intention is to climb the 
highest peak in the area, which B identifies with Mount X’s peak, and only because B 
believes that Mount X satisfies such a description has he the intention to ascend to it. 
In The Cake, John’s intention is akin to Climber A’s, whereas Pablo Ibbieta’s 
intention is more akin to Climber B’s. In Comrades, Ibbieta’s intention is not the addition 
of the intention to make believe that p plus the intention to make believe something false. 
His intention is just to make believe something false: (that he identifies with) p. As 
mentioned, to make believe that p only serves his purpose if it is a means to deceive, that 
                                                 
7 Neither this kind of lies nor the other one should be confused with Augustine’s real lies. 
Augustine identifies real lies as “the lie which is told solely for the pleasure of lying and 
deceiving” (Augustine in Deferrari, p. 109) simply for its own sake, with no further aim. 
8 We will now consider not linguistic intentions but intentions for action and will suggest a 
parallel between them that we take to be straightforward and illuminating. 
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is, to generate a false belief. Any proposition would have served his interests provided 
that believing it would amount to the hearer’s acquiring a false belief concerning the 
location of Gris. What Ibbieta wants to get is to conceal the truth to the hearers, not 
particularly that they believe what he states since any other proposition he could have 
stated would have been equally fitting on the condition that it would not be true and would 
prevent his interrogators from believing the truth on the issue – Gris’s whereabouts. 
Now suppose that the world is such as Ibbieta imagined it. Ibbieta intended that 
his inquisitors did not know that Gris was in his cousins’ house (q), not so much, or not 
essentially, that they believed that Gris was in the cemetery (p). It could work as well that 
they believed that he was hidden in the bell tower (r) as in the nearby farm (s). Therefore, 
in this kind of lies, unlike in doxogenic lies, the speaker has no special interest in making 
the hearer believe particularly the stated proposition as such, since the speaker could have 
chosen to state other (believed-false) propositions equally fitting to her goal. The 
speaker’s goal is not to make the hearer believe a certain proposition, but to prevent him 
from knowing a particular fact. The only reason the speaker wants to make the hearer 
believe what she states is to conceal the hearer a truth.9 Ibbieta wants his captors not to 
know where Gris is. And the question “Where is Gris?” allows for multiple and 
incompatible answers, so that all but one are false. Ibbieta’s interest is to make the hearers 
believe a false answer to that question – to make them not to know the right answer. 
Which one, among all possible false or wrong answers, is not significant, except for utility 
or pragmatic reasons: the best candidate will be the one appearing to be more plausible 
and convincing for the audience in that context. What Ibbieta is worried about the stated 
proposition is that it may sound plausible and convincing to his interrogators. 
 
5. The need to amend the definition 
Then we have, on the one hand, doxogenic lies, in which characteristically the speaker’s 
intention is to make believe specifically the stated content (which she believes to be false), 
independently of its truth-value. In The Cake, John specifically wants to make Mary 
believe that he did not eat the piece of cake. On the other hand, falsifying lies are defined 
                                                 
9 Jennifer Lackey (2013, 241) has argued that there are two ways of deceiving: 1) by concealing 
information about whether p, or 2) by bringing about a false belief regarding whether p. 1) and 2) 
are compatible—indeed, a way of concealing information about whether p is by causing a false 
belief regarding whether p, and this seems the only possible way of concealing truth by lying. 
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by the speaker’s intention to deceive, to make the hearer believe something false, in order 
to conceal the truth to the hearer. 
As advanced, each of these kinds of lies is defined by two distinct sets of 
conditions. In the case of doxogenic lies, the speaker states that p (which she believes to 
be false) with the straightforward intention to make the hearer believe that p. So they are 
characterized by the satisfaction of these conditions: 
 
- Statement Condition (SC): that the speaker makes a statement. 
- Believe-to-be-false Condition (BFC): that the speaker believes that what she 
states is false. 
- Intention-to-make-believe Condition (IMBC): that the speaker makes the 
statement with the intention to make the hearer believe the content of this 
statement. 
 
Thus, for doxogenic definitions like Mahon’s and Saul’s hold. But, since IMBC is 
different from IDC-W, Williams’s definition is not correct for them. The speaker’s 
intention is to make the hearer acquire the (believed-false) information that p, being 
essential to make the hearer believe that p, which (p being false) amounts to deceiving 
him. 
On the other hand, falsifying lies are to be defined as the joint satisfaction of: 
 
- Statement Condition (SC): that the speaker makes a statement. 
- Believe-to-be-false Condition (BFC): that the speaker believes that what she 
states is false. 
- Intention-to-deceive Condition à la Williams (IDCW): that the speaker makes 
the statement with the intention to deceive the addressee about the stated content. 
 
Or taking into account our independent proposal made at the end of the last section of 
framing the issue in terms of the answer to a question, IDCW could still be modified in 
the following lines: 
 
- Intention-to-deceive Condition modified (IDCM): that the speaker makes the 
statement with the intention to deceive the hearer about the answer to a certain 
question. (That the hearer’s resulting belief is a false answer to a certain question.) 
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In any event, in the case of falsifying lies, the speaker states that p (which she 
believes to be false) with the intention to make the hearer not believe that q (which is 
what the speaker believes to be true). The speaker’s intention is here to prevent the hearer 
from having the information that q (which the speaker believes to be true). In the case of 
falsifying lies, unlike the case of doxogenic lies, the speaker intends the hearer to believe 
that p only if his believing this amounts to being deceived. 
 
This takes us to our second point. If we are right and the category of ‘deceptive 
lies’ does actually include two different kinds of lies, which satisfy distinct conditions for 
lying, then the most accepted definitions are in need of revision – indeed, it seems dubious 
that a single definition valid for all ‘deceptive lies’ could finally be found. In particular, 
since falsifying lies only require IDC and doxogenic lies only require IMBC, traditionally 
accepted definitions of lying are not even valid for all ‘deceptive lies’.10 And this is 
particularly so if IMBC and IDC are mutually irreducible, as it seems.  
On the other hand, these conditions cannot be omitted from a definition of lying 
because assertions which clearly do not count as lies would then satisfy it. And it seems 
not possible to include both clauses in a unified definition. A possible manoeuvre 
regarding the former could be to replace these two conditions by a clause such as that the 
assertion is made in a warranting context—a strategy often followed by defenders of bald-
faced lies. But again, excluding the discussed conditions would involve losing some 
important distinctions. Concerning the latter, it seems that the only possible move for not 
renouncing to a unified definition of lying for all ‘deceptive lies’ would be to elaborate a 
sort of disjunctive definition, adding the following as the third condition:  
 
Disjunctive Clause (DC): the speaker makes the statement with the intention either 
to deceive or to be believed by the hearer. 
 
However, this would certainly be a (bad) sign of the fact that different phenomena are put 
together under one single label. 
 
                                                 10	  It is a consequence of our argument that not all so-called ‘deceptive lies’ are indeed deceptive 
– some are just a matter of making believe. We keep this label for ease of exposition although 
adding inverted commas. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
We consider our aims in this paper as having a similar significance to what the defence 
of bald-faced lies has meant for the traditional definition of lying. The acceptance of bald-
faced lies as a distinctive kind of lies has led their advocates to tell apart, against tradition, 
two broad kinds of lies – deceptive and non-deceptive – as well as to restrict the 
traditionally accepted definitions of lying just to the former, with the result that the intent 
to deceive can no longer be considered as a necessary condition for lying.11 However, 
this is not the last word about this since, even if bald-faced lies could be considered fully-
fledged lies, there would be an important difference between these and the archetypical 
lies, the deceptive ones, which could not be dodged. It seems that, although sometimes 
one can lie without intending to deceive, liars usually do intend it or, as we have remarked, 
intend the hearer to believe a proposition that the speaker believes to be false. And this is 
particularly relevant. After all, the usual worries raised by lying, including its alleged 
moral wrongness, come from the fact that lying is par excellence a form of (attempted) 
deception, and then manipulative.12 The further distinction that we have proposed has the 
consequence that the traditional definition is not satisfactory for ‘deceptive lies’ either. 
Let us sum up. We have proposed a distinction between two kinds of lies – 
doxogenic and falsifying lies – within the category of ‘deceptive lies’. We regard this 
distinction as an analytically significant distinction which has been overlooked in the 
literature on lying – which deserves to be more deeply explored. In addition, we have 
contended that the existence of these two kinds of lies – which are defined in terms of 
different conditions – pose some challenges to the viability of a unified definition of 
deceptive lies. Finally, the only way to preserve the possibility of a unified definition 
would be to suggest a disjunctive one, which in anyway would not prevent us from 
thinking that we are dealing with different phenomena for which we insist on having just 
one single name and definition.13 
                                                 
11 For the purposes of our argument, we do not need to commit ourselves with the reality of bald-
faced lies. 
12 Importantly, bald-faced lies, insofar as they are non-deceptive, are not manipulative, nor do 
they involve a breach of trust. Hence, they are neither epistemically nor morally problematic, as 
in principle ‘deceptive lies’, and lies tout court, appear to be. See Carson (2006, 302), Sorensen 
(2007), Faulkner (2007), and Fallis (2010, 4). 
13 We are very grateful to the members of Phronesis Analytic Philosophy Group that participated 
in the session of its regular seminar in which a version of this paper was discussed, especially to 
Josep Corbí and Carlos Moya for their helpful comments, as well as to the anonymous referees 
for Teorema. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the I REF (Red Española de 
Filosofía) Congress held in Valencia in September 2014 and published in its proceedings. 
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